An apple that I desire, is as much an object for me, as the one I will be eating in the future, as well as the one I am referring to using language. An intention may be empty and frustrated or it may be satisfied. Not only can it be a hallucination, a whim of fantasy or an error, but it may be an unconscious affect. In fact, one may not be conscious of it in the literal sense. It is important to note that the ‘something’ of which one is always conscious does not have to be a material thing, nor some mathematical or scientific certainty. Reading further into the text: “By ‘intentionality,’ we understand the distinguishing property of experiences: ‘being consciousness of something.’ … … a perceiving is a perceiving of something, for instance, a thing a judging is a judging of some state of affairs valuing is a valuing of a valued state wishing is a wishing for a wished state, and so forth.” (Husserl 2014, 162) Quoting further from the 2nd volume of the Logical Investigations: “In perception something is perceived, in imagination, something imagined, in a statement something stated, in love something loved, in hate hated, in desire desired etc.” (Husserl 2001, 95). The title of §84 of Ideas I speaks for itself: “Intentionality as the main theme of phenomenology” (Husserl 2014, 161). Intentional analysis refers to the description and clarification of our first-person perspective our primary form of engagement with the world. Phenomenology revolves around this central notion. Not only is it the basis of Phenomenological analysis, but also the source and foundation for other concepts within phenomenology. One cannot stress the importance of the concept of Intentionality enough. Intentionalityįirst introduced by Franz Brentano, Intentionality is for Husserl the basic structure of consciousness. The foundationalism and essentialism of this early period will be the target of the Heideggerian destruction, but the later developments will require a more fine-grained approach, as we will attempt to set the stage for a future deciphering of the differences between the later Husserl and the Heidegger of Being and Time. Husserl’s early works present a much more defined and rigid, systematic edifice. Nevertheless, significant differences will come to light throughout the paper. One of the reasons for this, is that Husserl’s later writing was already influenced by Heidegger’s views and (as already mentioned) undergoing serious revisions. It will not provide a complete and detailed account of Husserl’s later work, like his philosophy of history, or inter-subjectivity and the life-world, but it will discuss the questions of temporality, passive synthesis, retention, perception and protention briefly as a meeting ground for Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenological ideas. Instead, this paper will focus mostly, but not exclusively on the most basic concepts of phenomenology and primarily in its early development.
The very fabric of the phenomenological project may change with new materials entering the scholarly debate every several years. Not only does the difficulty arise from the inherent complexity of the system, nor because Husserl himself would change and revise his views to the extent that the later Husserl stands in direct opposition to his own earlier convictions, but also owing to the sheer amount of unpublished material still held at the Husserliana Archives here at the Institute of Philosophy in Leuven. It is quite impossible to present a complete exhaustive picture of Husserlian phenomenology, but we will attempt to approach the objective as closely as possible.
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